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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL HAZARD 
IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
1. Introduction 
The international dimension of environmental policy arises from the fact that 
pollutants generated as an inevitable byproduct of production in any country can cross 
national borders, carried by physical media like water or air. As a result, it is the total 
amount of accumulated pollutants that affects a country and not just the country's own 
emissions. These international environmental problems vary in nature from truly global 
problems. such as the depletion of the ozone layer or the global warming associated with the 
greenhouse effect, to more localized problems, such as the pollution of the Mediterranean 
or the acid rain problem in Europe. In practice, attempts to form a policy capable of dealing 
with international problems have focused on international agreements (e.g., the Helsinkl 
Protocol or the Montreal Protocol). In the recent literature in environmental economics, the 
focus has been on the emergence of international cooperation and underlying incentives 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1992a). 
The basic question in the case of cooperation is whether sovereign countries can 
voluntarily (since there is no authority to force their cooperation) reach an agreement to 
protect the international commons. When this type of cooperation is examined, there is a 
major difficulty since each country has an incentive to defect from the agreement when 
everybody else cooperates, since by doing so a country can reduce the cost of abating 
pollution and enjoy the benefits from the overall reduced pollution brought about by the 
cooperation of the rest of the countries. Furthermore, as has been shown by Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1992b), a small number of cooperating countries can not enlarge the coalition 
with self-financed utility transfers to countries that have no incentive to join it, unless the 
cooperating countries are committed to signing the agreement and then providing incentive 
for the enlargement of the cooperating group. This paper follows that argument. 
A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation are identified as the 
environmentally-conscious countries (ENCC). By assuming that the ENCC are committed 
to an agreement to protect the environment, conditions are examined under which these 
countries can provide side payments, which are self-financing, to a second group of less 
environmentally-conscious countries (LENCC). Under the proposed side payments scheme, 
all countries form a stable coalition that agrees to adjust their emissions so that a first-best 
global welfare optimum is achieved. A side payment scheme capable of securing a stable 
partial coalition of the ENCC with a subset of the LENCC is also examined. 
Having determined the system of side payments, a second problem is examined 
related to difficulties in enforcing the agreement, due to moral hazard. In particular, the case 
is considered in which the level of global pollution can be measured at a relatively low cost, 
whereas the cost of measuring each individual country's contribution to global pollution is 
prohibitively costly for an external observer. The country itself, on the other hand, can 
measure its contribution to global pollution at a relatively low cost. The inability to measure 
each country's emissions creates problems in the enforcement of the agreement, since 
countries have an incentive to cheat by emitting more than the agreement dictates. This is, 
therefore, a type of nonpoint source pollution case with an international dimension. Although 
a nonpoint source problem arising within a country can be handled by the imposition of 
collective penalty schemes (Segerson 1988, Xepapadeas 1991), the same formula does not 
apply here since there is no supranational authority to impose collective penalty schemes on 
sovereign countries. Thus in a second stage, a mechanism is developed which must be 
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incorporated into the agreement between the ENCC and the LENCC and which will induce 
the latter countries to emit at the desired level even when global pollution has nonpoint 
source characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes conditions for the 
achievement of a total or partial stable coalition; section 3 presents the mechanism that 
secures the enforcement of the agreement when monitoring of individual country's emissions 
is not possible; and section 4 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. First-Best Optimum and Stable Coalitions 
We consider a group of i=], ... ,N countries. Production activities in each country 
generate pollution. Pollution crosses boundaries and its total concentration in the 
environment affects the whole group. We assume that the benefit of each country is a strictly 
concave function of its emissions, e;, defined as: 
where e, belongs to some compact and convex subset of R+. The ambient concentration of 
the pollution defined as X= El; causes damages to all N countries. We assume that the 
damage function in each country takes the simple linear form m)(, where mi~ 0 measures 
marginal damages in country i. Following Hoel (1992), we assume that: 
ml~m2~ ... ~mN' M=~m?O 
i 
Therefore, countries with a low index, or high m, are considered to suffer the most damages 
from environmental pollution. If m=O for some country, then this country does not suffer 
any damages from global pollution. Under these assumptions, the benefit function for 
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country i is defined as a function of all other countries' emission levels: 
(1) 
where eoj = (e/, ... ,ej./, ej +/, ... ,eN)' If there is no international cooperation, each country's 
emissions are determined as the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game where each 
country chooses emissions simultaneously to maximize (1). Thus the Nash equilibrium 
emission level for each country is defined as: 
The non-cooperative emission levels can be compared to the emission levels corresponding 
to the first-best optimum which is obtained by maximizing global welfare, defined as the sum 
of individual countries' benefit functions: 
V(e l' ... ,eN) =tbj(ej,e_) (3)j 
A solution to the maximization of (3) can be regarded as the case where a supranational 
authority, if it existed, would set the emission levels for each country at the first-best 
optimum. This first-best emission level for each country is defined as: 
(4) 
Assuming that at least two ms are non-zero, then from (2) and (4), we have that: 
This is a well-established result in the analysis of the international aspects of pollution (e.g., 
van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992). Not all countries, however, are better off at the first-
best optimum as compared to the Nash equilibrium (Hoel 1992). Some countries for which: 
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B.(e )-B.(e)
m,< I I I I 
I -. (5) x-x 
will be worse off at the first-best optimum in comparison to the Nash equilibrium. These 
countries will be characterized by low m in the case where the benefit functions of all 
countries are fairly similar. On the other hand, countries for which: 
B.(e.)-B.(e)
m.> I I I I 
I • (6)X-X 
will be better off at the first-best optimum. We define countries for which (6) holds as 
environmentally conscious, and countries for which (5) holds as less environmentally 
conscious. We index the ENCC by JEJ and the LENCC by kEK. The sets J and K are 
assumed to be not empty in order to make the problem interesting. They partition the set 
/={J, ... ,Nj, that is, JUK=/, JnK=4>. 
It is clear that in the presence of ENCC and LENCC, there will be no voluntary 
cooperation by all N countries for the achievement of the first-best. Assume that the ENCC 
can form a coalition under which each country will emit at the first-best level. This coalition 
will be stable if it is both internally and externally stable in the sense of the cartel stability 
defined in d'Aspremont el al. (1983). Internal stability means that there is no incentive to 
defect from the coalition, or: 
It should be noted that although environmental consciousness, as defined in (6), is necessary 
for internal stability, it is not, however, sufficient. Thus the ENCC can not always form an 
internally-stable coalition. External stability, on the other hand, means that there is no incen-
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tive for any LENCC to enter the coalition and emit at the first-best level, or: 
Conditions are now examined under which this coalition can achieve the first-best 
optimum. Assume that the ENCC try to expand the coalition by self-financing side payments 
to the LENCC. In order to attract a country from the fringe of the LENCC, say country k, 
the total benefits of the ENCC after attracting country k must exceed the loss of this country, 
or: 
When (9) holds and country k receives a transfer greater than or equal to its loss, country 
k has an incentive to join the coalition. If this happens, however, and the transfer is paid, 
some members of the ENCC coalition might want to defect. This can be shown from (7). 
If the amount that j has to contribute to induce country k to enter the coalition is sufficiently 
high so that the inequality in (7) is reversed, then country j has an incentive to defect. This 
underlying inability to enlarge the coalition through self-financing transfers so that new 
members emit at the first-best is similar to results obtained by Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1992b). It is interesting to note that the more environmentally conscious a country is, the 
stronger the incentive will be to defect from the coalition. 
A stable larger coalition could, however, be formed if some subset of the group of 
countries were .to commit to cooperation (Carraro and Siniscalco 1992b). Conditions are 
examined, therefore, under which a commitment to cooperation by the ENCC, to emit at the 
first-best, could induce cooperation by all LENCC so that the whole group is a stable coali-
tion. These conditions are stated in the following proposition. 
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Proposition I: 
(i) ~f all J countries commit to cooperation, ana (ii) (f 
then there exists a system of self-financed side payments lk,kE K such that all LENCC enter 
the coalition and emit at the first-best level ofemission. The coalition of all N countries is 
stable. 
Proof 
The kth country from the LENCC will be no worse off under the first-best if it receives a 
side payment: 
ik=Bk(ek)-B/ek)-mkCi.-X) 
which is equal to its losses for moving to the first-best. This transfer might not, however, 
be enough to ensure stability of the coalition, since country k will have an incentive to defect 
once all other countries have entered the coalition. The gains from defection are defined as: 
(11) 
If tk ~ dk , then there will be no incentive for country k to defect. Thus the coalition is 
internally stable since by (i) the J countries are committed to cooperation and also by (ii) the 
side payments are self-financed. Q.E.D. 
The above proposition implies that if there is a large number of ENCC so that the 
benefits from moving to the first-best are sufficient, then the ENCC can offer sufficient 
inducement for the LENCC to form a stable coalition wherein all countries will emit at the 
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first-best. A stable coalition can also be achieved if the marginal pollution damages of the 
LENCC are sufficiently small. To show that, write: 
eA; =X- IJ es' eA; =X- IJ eS 
Sf! Sf!s-A; s-A; 
Substituting et and ~t into (10) and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
The right-hand side of (12) is always positive, since it represents the difference in total 
benefits between the first-best and the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Therefore (12) or 
equivalently (10) will be satisfied if 117t are sufficiently small. 
The requirement that all countries enter the coalition might be too strong. However, 
the approach used to derive conditions that ensure the stability of the coalition of all countries 
can be used to examine partial expansion. By a partial expansion, it is meant that the ENCC 
and some of the LENCC can form a stable coalition with all countries emitting at the first-
best optimum, while the rest of the LENCC emit at the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Assume that the set K of LENCC is partitioned into sets Hand Q, hEH, qEQ, Q~<t>. 
Assume that countries in set H emit at the first-best optimum while countries in set Q emit 
at the noncooperative Nash level, and define: 
X'=IJej+IJe h +IJe , then clearly X<X ,<X.qj h q 
Assume finally that for all ENCC in set J, condition (6) is satisfied when Xis replaced by 
X'. If (6) is not satisfied for some ENCC when X is replaced by X', the set of ENCC should 
be redefined accordingly. Then the condition for a partial expansion of the coalition of the 
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ENCC can be stated as follows. 
Proposition 2: 
(i) If all ENCC commit to cooperation, and (H) if 
then there exists a system ofselffinanced side payments th' hE H, such that the LENCC that 
belong 10 set H enter the coalition and emit at the first-best. The coalition qf the countries 
that belong to the set J U H is stable. 
The gains from defection for any country hEH are defined as: 
d, =[B,(e,l-m{" +~e. +7ej+:~~eJ[B,re,)-m~7ej+;e, +~e.)l or 
dh=B,,(eh)-Bhreh)-mh(eh-eh) (14) 
If t" ~d" there will be no incentive for country h to defect. Thus the partially expanded 
coalition is stable. Q.E.D. 
By comparing (13) with (10), it can be noted that although the gains of the ENCC 
from the partial expansion of the coalition, and thus the total amount available for side 
payments, is less than the case where a total coalition is achieved, a successful partial 
expansion might be possible if there are LENCC for which the marginal pollution damage 
is sufficiently small. This can be seen be rewriting (13) in order to obtain an inequality 
similar to (12). 
The achievement of the first-best requires, however, that the emissions of each 
individual country can be observed. If this is not possible, either because it is too costly or 
because it is technically impossible, then the LENCC will have an incentive to cheat. An 
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additional mechanism is required to ensure the enforcement of the agreement so that the first-
best or a partial enlargement of the initial coalition of ENCC is achieved. This is the 
problem addressed in the next section. 
3. Enforcinfj the A~reement under Moral Hazard 
If monitoring of the emission level of an individual country is prohibitively costly, 
then the ENCC, which in the sequel are supposed to act as a single agent because they are 
committed to cooperation, can not observe the contribution to the global pollution by each 
of the LENCC. On the other hand, an LENCC k, if asked, is able to verify its emission 
level by incurring a fixed costJ:.. >0, kE K. This asymmetry between the costs of monitoring 
. and verification can easily be justified. An external observer sent by the ENCC to measure 
the emission level of an LENCC will most probably spend a lot of money to collect the 
information required for the report, while the same information could be collected at a 
relatively low cost by the country itself. It is further assumed that the cost of measuring 
global pollution is low, and to simplify things, it is set at zero. 
The question addressed in this section is whether the global optimum (or the optimal 
level of pollution in case of a partial agreement) can still be achieved in the presence of 
moral hazard; that is, when each LENCC has an incentive to first sign the agreement and 
then overemit. If a supranational authority existed, it could impose collective penalty 
schemes to eliminate any incentives of an LENCC to cheat, but this is not possible in an 
international setup. To deal with moral hazard in the international commons, a modification 
of a procedure which is an integral part of the Civil Code of many countries·, and has been 
applied repeatedly in the courts, is proposed. This procedure mandates that if a Debtor A 
ISee, for example, section IV, chapter Ill, book IV of the Spanish Civil Code. 
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owes a given amount of money to a group of agents, without knowing how much he owes 
to each one of them, he has the right to arbitrarily choose one agent (say, his creditor I) and 
transfer the whole amount of debt to him. Creditor I then becomes a debtor towards the rest 
of the group. Creditor 1, in turn, may arbitrarily choose one of the other creditors and trans-
fer the whole amount of debt to him, minus the part he claims A owes to him. This 
procedure continues up to the point where only one creditor is left; he then receives the 
residual. If the last creditor is not satisfied with the residual, he may appeal to the courts 
asking for more money from his predecessor. If the last creditor proves his claim to be 
valid, he may in turn appeal to the courts, accusing the previous creditor in the chain of a 
false claim, and so on. 
Consider the following game. The players are the LENCC, each acting in its own 
interest, and the group of ENCC acting as a single agent. The game is played in Ihree 
srages. The first is the ne}!,orialion stage. In this stage all parties involved sign an agreement 
which specifies (i) each individual country's level of emission Xi"' i=1 'OO. ,N, (ii) a vector of 
lump-sum transfers from the ENCC to the LENCC, Ik , kE K, with T=r.lk , to be paid if the 
measured global pollution, X"" equals the agreed X" = r.xi" ; and (Hi) a total amount of 
transfers. T/'= T-minlk, for every other X", ~X" to be distributed among the LENCC through 
the Mechanism (M*) , which is described below. The second is the (Jc!U(Jl pollurion stage. 
Each country decides independently its emission level Xi' i =1, .. ,N. Given that by 
assumption xj=x/ for all jEl, if X", ~X" each LENCC receives t, and the game ends. If, 
however, X", >X", that is, if one or more of the LENCC have overemitted, we proceed to 
the last stage of the game, the implemenralion of Ihe Mechanism M* stage. 
Note that whenever the measured pollution level is higher than the agreed, by no 
matter how much, the same total amount of transfers will be distributed among the LENCC. 
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This amount is equal to the sum of the transfers minus its smallest component, if all parties 
respect the agreement. This implies that there is always enough money for transfers to those 
LENCC which stick to the agreement. Put otherwise, given that an LENCC which cheats has 
no right to receive any side-payment, the ENCC "owe" at most Tc to the group of LENCC 
if X", >x". The Mechanism M* then works as follows. 
The ENCC randomly select one of the LENCC (w.l.o.g., say LENCC 1) and make 
it a "promise" of transfer T,.. LENCC 1 in turn chooses at random one of the other LENCC 
(say 2) and makes it a "promise" of Tc-s" thus claiming s, for itself. If s, ~ I" then LENCC 
1 will receive a zero transfer at the end of the procedure, while the ENCC "debt" is 
automatically reduced by I,. An LENCC which claimed s, ~/, must also announce its level 
of emissions. LENCC 2 then receives a "promise" of Tc-I" either because LENCC 1 
claimed I, or because I, has subtracted from ENCC "debt". The procedure is repeated by 
LENCC 2 replacing LENCC 1 and so on. In this way, the last LENCC in the chain (say f) 
always receives a "promise" less than Ir, since Elk = T> T,., kE K. If the sum of the an-
nounced overemissions of those LENCC which claimed Sk ~/k equals Xm-x" (measured minus 
agreed level of pollution), the game ends with the ENCC satisfying all the outstanding claims 
as well as making a transfer le to LENCC f. 
Otherwise, LENCC £ has two options: to initiate the procedure qfver(ficalion or not. 
If not, it receives a zero transfer in the end and must also announce its emission level. The 
procedure of verification works backwards. Starting from the last in the chain, LENCC £ 
asks sequenrially for verification of the emission level from its predecessors which still have 
outstanding claims. That is, LENCC £ will request verification first from LENCC £-h if 
LENCC f-1, .. ,£-11+1 have claimed Sk~/k' and so on. An LENCC asked for verification is 
obliged to provide it. If its emission level differs from the agreed one, it receives a transfer 
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of zero in the end. The procedure of verification stops whenever the sum of overemisslons 
of both LENCC which verified and those which initially claimed sk;t tkequals XIII-X"' Then 
all still outstanding claims are paid and LENCC f receives tt. Finally, if LENCC f does not 
start the procedure of verification, its first predecessor with an outstanding claim, LENCC 
f-h replaces it, and again faces the above two options; and so on. 
Note that an LENCC has nothing to gain from a false announcement of its emission 
level, so we shall assume that such announcements are truthful. Further, an LENCC which 
overemitted but still starts the procedure of verification, will be discovered eventually (and 
will receive no transfer) because the sum of overemissions will turn out to be less than )(",-X" 
even after all LENCC have announced or verified their emission levels. Thus an LENCC 
which overemitted has no gains from the verification procedure. 
To show that the global optimum can be achieved, suppose that tk=dkwith dkdefined 
in (11). An LENCC receives a transfer equal to its gains from defection from the first-best 
whenever it emits at the first-best level, or overemits but is not caught. Then if condition 
(10) is satisfied and ENCC are committed to cooperation, all countries will be better off at 
the global optimum, provided that no LENCC has an incentive to cheat by overemitting. 
Hence, if the above mechanism detects cheating, all countries have an incentive to sign the 
proposed scheme in the negotiation stage. We now prove that the above scheme does, in 
fact, detect cheating. 
Proposition 3: 
Given that xj=(1jfor jE}, Xk=(1k kE K is a Perfect Equilibrium for the Subgame staningfrom 
stage 2. Equivalently, each LENCC will independently choos.e its emission level according 
to the first-best. 
Proof: First, an LENCC k which emits at the agreed level (1k will always make a claim of 
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I k if it can, or else it will start the procedure of verification if necessary, despite whatever 
actions the other LENCC have taken so far, and despite whatever LENCC k's beliefs are 
about the future actions of the other LENCC. Suppose now that xk=it for all kE K, k ~ f. 
Does LENCC f have an incentive to choose Xt~f.t? For any xtSit, XmS)( and LENCC 
e will receive It; further, bt '(xt,.) <0 for all x t Sir' Thus LENCC t has no incentive to 
underemit. Does it have an incentive to overemit? If X t >et, then Xm >)( and mechanism 
M* will be implemented. Given the fact that LENCC f can infer that it is the only one which 
overemitted, the best it can do is not to start the procedure of verification if it is last in the 
chain, and to claim any St~/t in all other positions. Ifit comes last in the chain and it starts 
the procedure of verification, it will be caught eventually because all others will be able to 
verify their emission level. Then it receives the same transfer of zero as if it had not started 
it. If it asks for It in any other position, it knows that the last LENCC in the chain will start 
the verification procedure, so LENCC f will be asked to verify its emission level. Not only 
does it receive a zero transfer in this case, but it also incurs a cost.ft. By claiming St~/t or 
not starting the verification procet:lure, however, LENCC f will end up receiving a zero 
transfer. Thus, an argument similar to proposition 1 shows that LENCC ehas no incentive 
to deviate from tt. This shows that Xk=tk, kEK is a Nash Equilibrium of the subgame 
starting from stage 2. 
To show that this a Perfect Equilibrium, it is necessary to specify LENCC f strategy 
in the case where it infers that it is not the only country which overemitted. The best 
strategy that LENCC f can follow is never to start the verification procedure, and whenever 
asked to claim St~/t, regardless of whatever actions other L~NCC have taken so far and 
whatever f's beliefs about future actions of the remaining LENCC. Note first that all 
LENCC, which either claimed Sk~ Ik or did not start the verification procedure, have also 
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announced their emission levels. Thus if LENCC f starts the verification procedure (either 
being the last in the chain or having received the initiative from the next LENCC to it), it 
will be caught eventually because even after all the rest of the LENCC have verified their 
actual emission levels, the measured global pollution will still exceed the sum of individually 
announced and verified levels. Hence it cannot improve upon a zero transfer. If it claims tr, 
there will always be some country which will start the verification procedure. If the 
initiative is given to LENCC t, we showed that it will pass it to the LENCC preceding it, 
thus receiving a zero transfer. If some other LENCC starts the verification procedure, 
LENCC r will be asked to verify its emission level, thus spending.t; and moreover receiving 
no transfer. Again it cannot improve upon a zero transfer. This completes the proof that 
Xk={'k' kE K is a Perfect Equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
Note that in equilibrium no country will ever be asked to verify its emission level, 
thus no cost.h. will ever be incurred. Notice further that there might be cases out of 
equilibrium where the system of transfers is not self-financed. However, it could be assumed 
that the ENCC are committed not only to cooperation, but also to incurring some additional 
costs if something goes wrong. Proposition 3 allows us to extend proposition 1 in the 
presence of moral hazard. 
Pmnosition 4: 
(f (i) all J ENCC commit to cooperation, and (ii) condition (10) holds, there exists a system 
qfse(f-financed side payments tk, kEK and a mechanism (M') such that each LENCC has an 
incentive to emit at its .first-best emission level even if individual monitoring is prohibitively 
.costly. 
Similar results can be obtained if the required side payments are not sufficient to 
obtain the cooperation of all countries involved, but instead are enough for a partial 
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augmentation of the initial coalition of the ENCC. 
4. Summary 
When each country is affected not just by its own emissions, but by the total amount 
of global pollution, then international environmental policy should be developed. In this 
paper, conditions under which sovereign countries can voluntarily achieve an agreement to 
protect the international commons are examined. A problem which arises in the case of 
international commons is that each country has an incentive to defect from the agreement 
when all other countries cooperate, since by doing so a country can reduce the cost of 
abating pollution and enjoy the benefits from the overall reduced pollution brought about by 
the cooperation of the rest of the countries. 
It is shown that if there exists a group of environmentally-conscious countries -
identified as countries gaining from moving from the noncooperative equilibrium to the first-
best - which are committed to protecting the environment, these countries can induce all or 
a subset of the less environmentally-conscious countries to also emit at a global first-best 
level by a system of self-financed side payments if either of the following conditions holds: 
(i) the number of ENCC is large enough, and/or their benefits from achieving the global 
first-best are sufficiently high. or (ii) the marginal disutility of each of the LENCC is suffi-
ciently small. The implicit assumption here is that ENCC act as a single agent, which 
therefore has incentive to stick to its first-best emission level, and pay the total amount of 
transfers. 
It is further shown that observability of the emission level of each LENCC is not 
crucial to our results. Even if individual monitoring is prohibitively costly, the global first-
best can be achieved under the same conditions as previously. Given that global pollution can 
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be measured costlessly, and that an LENCC is able to verify its emission level if ever asked 
to do so, by incurring a cost, a mechanism is developed which guarantees that each LENCC 
has incentive to report its emission level truthfully. The possibility of errors in measurement 
of the global or individual levels of emissions has not been examined in this paper. It 
remains for further research to answer whether a global first-best can be achieved if there 
exist errors in measuring pollution and/or uncertainty on the part of certain countries in 
controlling their pollution level. 
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